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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JAMES W. STIVERS and
KAYL YNN A. STIVERS

)
)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, COMMISSIONER )
STATE TAX COMMISSION
)
)
Defendant/Respondent
)

Supreme Court Case No. 40007-2012

APPELLANTS'BRIEF

APPELLANTS'BRIEF

Appealed from the District Court of the Second Judicial District
Of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Latah

HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

James W. Stivers
Kaylynn A. Stivers
1435 DeSmet Rd.
DeSmet, ID 83824

Pro Se

Phil N. Skinner
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 36
Boise, ID 83 722

Attorney for Respondent
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Respondent, Commissioner on behalf of the Idaho State Tax Commission, entered a
ruling of a tax deficiency against the Appellants, James and Kaylynn Stivers, dated January 18,
2011 and ordered them to pay $16,915. The Stivers appealed the ruling to the Board of Tax
Appeals and offered the Commission a check of $500 and their only substantive asset, their
home, as surety for the 20% bond deposit required by Idaho Code 63-3049(b ), and pursuant
thereof, which was rejected by the attorney for the Tax Commission, Phil N. Skinner (Clerk's
Record on Appeal, pages 17, 56 and 58).
Consequently, the Board of Tax Appeals denied the Stivers their right to appeal for
failure to provide security as described by the Tax Commission Administrative and Enforcement
Rules rule 600 (IDAP A 35.02.01.600). Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
On July 18, 2011, the Stivers filed a Complaint against the Idaho State Tax Commission
in Idaho District Court, Second Judicial District, as a court of original jurisdiction for citizens
with complaints against agencies of state government (Clerk's Record, page 6). The Court
dismissed the case in a final ruling on April 17, 2012, for lack of jurisdiction due to the statutory
limitations imposed by LC. 63-3049(b) (Clerk's Record, page 83).
Pursuant of the Idaho Constitution Article V, Section 2 and Article V, Section 9,
Appellants now petition the Idaho Supreme Court to exercise the judicial power of the state and
either try the case as the only constitutional court of original jurisdiction over the subject matter,
or in the alternative, to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court to do so on its behalf.
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Background

It appears that only the Idaho Supreme Court has been endowed with the unencumbered
judicial power of the state and has the authority to review the constitutional validity of various
statutes and rules under which the Idaho State Tax Commission operates. Heretofore, the Board
of Tax Appeals and the District Court have proceeded as administrative tribunals operating under
the authority of statute and limited by statute.
The Idaho Supreme Court is not so limited. In addition to its many duties, it has the
responsibility to exercise the judicial power of the state and to review the various actions of the
executive and legislative branches of government (Id. Const. Art. V, § 13). In this case, the
Appellants will argue that LC. 63-3049(b) is unconstitutionally vague if administrative agencies,
such as the State Tax Commission, are allowed the discretion to interpret it arbitrarily and in a
manner which disregards the rights of the citizen or which violates its constitutional mandate of
fair and equal taxation (Id. Const. Art VII, §§ 3, 5 - the legislature having made income taxable
property).
While property bonds are routinely used in criminal cases, for the Tax Commission, if the
Respondent's attorney is to be believed, they are not acceptable substitutes for the 20% rule. The
Respondent's attorney has never provided to the Appellants any policy statement issued by the
Tax Commission, no minutes of proceedings, nor even an internal memo, which would support
his claim that a property bond would not satisfy the statute. In criminal cases, it must be readily
assumed that the purpose of the property bond is in the interest of justice as an alternative to cash
should sources of credit not be available to the accused. Why, then, in the interests of justice is it
not provided as an alternative in civil cases?
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In the fall of 2008, the nation was in the grips of financial panic. So dire was the crisis,
the U.S. Treasurer issued a warning to the Congress that if emergency action was not taken, the
nation would experience a financial collapse that would bring a halt to commerce. The prospects
of such a collapse resulted in congressional discussion of martial law and other emergency
measures to maintain order. Quick action brought an end to the panic, but the nation
experienced a precipitous decline of equitable value in virtually all assets. The contraction
resulted in depression-style conditions, especially in the building industry. The principal source
of livelihood for the Stivers was then and remains connected to economic conditions in the
building industry. They have either been unemployed or underemployed in recent years (Clerk's
Record, p. 58). It was in the midst of this crisis that the tax deficiency was imposed by the Tax
Commission.
For various reasons, the Stivers found the Commissioner's ruling to be unfair and wanted
their "day in court." Economic hardships prevented them from paying the 20% bond deposit; so
in the alternative, they offered the value of their home, which according to the county assessor's
office, was worth far more than the tax ruling. The Stivers felt that a property bond should have
been acceptable, considering the economic conditions. They applied for loans, but were turned
down (Clerk's Record, p.56). They felt the Tax Commission would be agreeable. It wasn't.
Appellants have come to believe that the Tax Commission views them as "tax protestors" and
that this mischaracterization explains why the Commission has acted capriciously against them
by withholding vital information and denying them their day in court (Clerk's Record, pgs. 12,

73).
After further research, they discovered that they were not alone. Many of their fellow
citizens were being bullied by the Tax Commission. They learned about a culture of profligacy
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at the Commission in which out-of-state corporations were given "sweetheart" deals to settle
their tax deficiencies while ordinary citizens were given none (Clerk's Record, pgs. 59-63).
They looked at the Commission's process and calculations and began to see a corrupt
practice of inflating a tax liability by lumping tax years together into one claim to keep the
ordinary citizen with limited resources out of court.
The Appellants are prepared to argue that the Tax Commission has misread its statutory
authority to tax beyond the statute of limitations; that it has relied upon faulty or spurious
affidavits; and that it has perpetuated a policy of favoring corporate persons over and against the
interests of natural persons, thereby, violating the anti-discrimination clause of the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF- 6

RELIEF REQUESTED

Appellants petition the Court to the Relief Requested in the Complaint filed with the
District Court or to other remedies which the Court might deem just.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

The first matter before the Court is whether the Idaho Tax Commission had the
statutory authority to reject the Appellants' offer of a property bond. In the
larger context, did the Legislature intend by creating statute 63-3049(b) to give
the Commission that authority? Furthermore, if it did intend to give that
authority, did the legislature itself have the constitutional authority to do so?
The Idaho Constitution requires in Article I, Section 18 that citizens are to be
guaranteed free and speedy justice "without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice."
We might rightly assume that the legislature does not have the authority, nor
would it ever have the intent to empower a state agency with the power to
violate this right.
Did the Tax Commission's rejection of the Appellants' offer of a surety
bond have the effect of denying them "free and speedy" justice? It would
certainly seem so. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 36.01.01 requires
that the Commission put the taxpayer's rights first and foremost:
"These rules will be liberally construed to secure just, speedy, and economical
determination of all issues presented to the Board [of Appeals]." (Rule 21)
By analogy, if the legislature felt it was important and the courts have so
upheld it that property bonds in criminal cases serve the interests of justice, we
might wonder why that is not so in a civil case? Are not genuine rights of the
citizen at stake in civil matters, as well?
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2.

Article I, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits local and special laws
"for the assessment and collection of taxes" and "regulating the practice of
courts of justice." Without the property bond, citizens are forced to seek
sureties from private, for-profit establishments, such as banks and other
lenders, which are under no legal obligation to lend at all and otherwise are free
to charge whatever interest they choose within the limits allowed by statute. If,
for example, banks were lending in the 1st Judicial District but not the 2nd
Judicial District, then it would be easier to obtain justice in the first district and
not the second. Denial of the property bond would have the effect of leaving
the citizen at the mercy of private lenders and would have the perverse effect of
"regulating" access to the courts of justice. In tax cases, it would exclude the
poor and others who pose a credit risk. Lenders want to make a profit. The
interests of justice and the 20% rule are not to provide a source of profit for
private lenders. The intent is to prevent frivolous lawsuits and to guarantee the
fidelity of the citizen in the advent of an adverse judicial ruling, which the
property bond accomplishes.
As for "local and special" laws for the assessment and collection of taxes
prohibited by the Idaho Constitution, we can see how excluding the property
bond has this precise effect. The Constitution is forbidding a disproportionate
and selective enforcement of the tax laws. Clearly, those who have access to
credit have an advantage over those who do not, and to the extent that certain
groups are more appealing to lenders (such as large corporations), we would
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expect to see tax collectors avoiding those who can defend themselves in court
and concentrating on easy targets, such as working class families.

3. The Appellants are prepared to argue that the State Tax Commission built its
case against the Stivers by drawing from alleged tax obligations of over a
decade, beyond the customary 3-year limitation. It relied upon faulty or
spurious affidavits, and an assumption that the Stivers were tax protestors. This
led to a capricious interpretation and selective enforcement of the tax collection
laws. Vital information was withheld from the Stivers until it was almost too
late. Specious reasoning was used to justify rejecting the property bond and no
care was taken to show good cause or due diligence in considering the their
request for documentation or explanation.
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CONCLUSION

This case is not about the legitimacy of the state income tax. It is not about the right of
the Tax Commission to collect taxes. This case is about the right of the citizen to his day in
court. It is about whether it is just for state government to force its citizens into debt peonage to
private lenders who hold the keys of access to justice. It is about discrimination between persons
who have different kinds of property: property controlled by banks as opposed to property owned
and controlled by the people.

Respectfully submitted this 2i11 day of September, 2012

James W. Stivers, Pro Se

Kaylynn A. Stivers, Pro Se
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